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ABSTRACT 
Agency theory predicts that corporate governance (CG) and audit quality (AQ) 
enhance the convergence of interests between shareholders and managers and enable 
investors and lenders to have better perception on the optimum level of cost of debt capital. 
However, there is a lack of studies that investigate this issue in the emerging markets, 
particularly in Malaysia. Therefore, this research is conducted to investigate the relationship 
between internal monitoring characteristics of board of director and audit committee relating 
to the size, independence, financial expertise, frequency of meeting, ethnicity and education 
of directors and ethnicity of chairperson, and AQ as proxies by audit fees, non-audit service 
fees and industry specialist auditor, as external monitoring on the cost of debt capital. This 
study reports the results of  multivariate analysis on dataset that were obtained from the 
Bursa Malaysia, DataStream, Bloomberg and annual reports of firms between 2003 and 
2012. The empirical results of this study indicate that larger size and independent non-
executive directors with less frequent directors’ meeting, ethnicity of Malay directors on the 
board, larger size and more frequent meeting of audit committee have significant effects on 
reducing the agency problem with internal monitoring function. These lead to a reduction in 
the cost of raising fund from lenders in capital market. The results also indicate that hiring 
industry specialist auditors and using non-audit services of external auditors have remarkable 
influence on reducing the information asymmetry with external monitoring function, which 
help to lower the cost of debt capital in the capital market. Findings are consistent with the 
agency theory, signaling theory and cultural theory, whereby internal and external CG 
mechanisms are associated with effective monitoring, which in turn helps to lower 
information asymmetry and agency problem in capital markets and consequently increases 
potential investors and lenders. The findings are of potential interest to policy makers, board 
members, audit committee members and external auditors. 
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ABSTRAK 
Teori agensi meramalkan tadbir urus korporat (CG) dan kualiti audit (AQ) 
mempertingkatkan penyatuan antara kepentingan pemegang saham dengan kepentingan 
pengurus serta memperbaiki persepsi pelabur dan pemberi pinjaman tentang aras kos modal 
hutang yang optimum. Namun, tidak banyak kajian dilakukan untuk mengkaji isu ini dalam 
pasaran yang semakin berkembang, khususnya di Malaysia. Oleh sebab itu, kajian ini 
dijalankan untuk meneliti hubungan antara ciri-ciri pemantauan dalaman lembaga pengarah 
dan jawatankuasa audit dalam hal yang berkaitan dengan saiz, ketakbersandaran, kepakaran 
kewangan, kekerapan mesyuarat, etnik dan pendidikan pengarah dan etnik pengerusi, dan 
AQ  yang diproksi oleh fi audit, fi perkhidmatan bukan audit dan juruaudit pakar industri, 
sebagai pemantauan luaran bagi kos modal hutang. Penyelidikan ini melaporkan keputusan 
analisis multivariat bagi set data yang diperoleh daripada Bursa Malaysia, DataStream, 
Bloomberg dan laporan tahunan syarikat dari tahun 2003 hingga tahun 2012. Keputusan 
empirikal daripada kajian ini menunjukkan pengarah bukan eksekutif dengan bilangan ahli 
yang lebih besar dan bebas serta menjalankan mesyuarat pengarah dengan kurang kerap, 
lembaga pengarah beretnik Melayu, jawatankuasa audit dengan bilangan ahli yang lebih 
besar dan menjalankan mesyuarat dengan lebih kerap mempunyai kesan ketara dalam 
mengurangkan masalah agensi dengan fungsi pemantauan dalaman. Hal ini membawa 
kepada pengurangan kos bagi mendapatkan pembiayaan daripada pemberi pinjaman dalam 
pasaran modal. Keputusan ini juga menunjukkan bahawa pengambilan juruaudit pakar 
industri dan penggunaan perkhidmatan bukan audit daripada juruaudit luar mempunyai 
kesan yang ketara dalam mengurangkan maklumat yang tidak bersimetri dengan fungsi 
pemantauan luaran, yang seterusnya membantu mengurangkan kos modal hutang dalam 
pasaran modal. Dapatan ini konsisten dengan teori agensi, teori isyarat dan teori budaya, 
iaitu mekanisme CG dalaman dan luaran berkait rapat dengan pemantauan berkesan yang 
seterusnya membantu mengurangkan keasimetrian maklumat dan masalah agensi dalam 
pasaran modal lalu menambahkan bilangan bakal pelabur dan peminjam. Dapatan ini 
mungkin penting kepada penggubal dasar, ahli lembaga pengarah, ahli jawatankuasa audit 
dan juruaudit luar.  
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  CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview 
This chapter provides study outline, which is comprised of eleven sections: 
Section 1.2 provides the research background. Section 1.3 discusses the problem 
statements, while sections 1.4, 1.5, and 1.6 focus on the research questions, the 
research objectives, and the significance and contributions of the study. Section 1.7 
highlights the scope of the study. Sections 1.8, 1.9, 1.0 and 1.11 methodologies, 
limitation of study, thesis outline, and the terminology used.  
1.2 Background of Research 
Cost of debt is one of the burdens a company can be exposed to as it raises  
debt ; this cost is reflected in the interest charged on the money borrowed, which is 
the amount of money the company pays for the privilege of using borrowed money 
to run or expand its business. It represent the interest that is paid on bank loans, bond 
options, and similar types of financial transactions (Ertugrul and Hegde, 2008). 
According to Abdulhafedh (2006), firms finance their activities using funds from 
debt and equity; however, most successful companies depend on debt more than 
equity fund. It is documented that the value of borrowing is much greater than equity 
funding only from its owners and companies with mixed financing (internally and 
externally) as having more weight in the marketplace than companies funded by 
owners. So, it has been argued that a healthy financial structure must consist of mix 




2001). However, the importance of debt as a source of funding for companies needs 
to be approached carefully because excessive debt could affect companies’ riskiness 
which would eventually negatively affect the shareholders wealth (Ertugrul and 
Hegde, 2008). 
It is well recognized that cost of debts is considered an important issue for all 
companies due to several reasons. Firstly, companies can manage their finance 
effectively when they obtain the best interest rate. Secondly, calculating the cost of 
debt capital as it applies to incurring more debt can assist companies to weigh the 
benefits of the potential action with the liabilities. Finally, evaluating properly the 
cost of debt will assist companies to determine effectively on whether to issue a bond 
to finance upcoming projects or not (Warga and Welch, 1993). Bhojraj and Sengupta 
(2003) indicate that companies can get low cost debts through a reduction in default 
risk due to reduced agency problems and improved monitoring of managerial actions 
when companies have stronger corporate governance. 
The number of accounting scandals in North America and Europe has 
increased between 1990 and the start of the 21st century. This period of time saw 
accounting fraud committed by organizations such as Enron, HealthSouth, Xerox, 
Parmalat, WorldCom, and Tyco (Njuguna and Moronge, 2013). These scandals have 
brought to light the importance of monitoring systems such as corporate governance 
(CG). CG does not directly impact the performance of a corporation nor does it 
directly influence the organization’s cost of raising funds. Instead, CG suggests 
solutions for agency problems that combines the interests of management and that of 
shareholders (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). The effectiveness of using CG as a 
monitoring system was confirmed by Gul and Tsui (2001). Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) pointed out that there may be conflicts 
between the interests of management and shareholders when  management roles are 
separated from that of shareholders. Therefore, different internal and external 
mechanisms have been considered via CG to prevent agency conflicts as well as to 




CG mechanisms are classified into internal and external mechanism. The 
internal mechanisms include board of directors, audit committee, institutional 
shareholders, insider ownership, and dividend policy. Meanwhile, external 
mechanisms include takeover, product market competition, external auditors, 
managing labour market, mutual monitoring by managers, and the legal environment 
(Farinha, 2003). Regulators around the world are increasingly looking to set 
standards or codes of best practice for CG to attract more capital or foreign 
investment to the country (Agrawal and Chadha, 2005). For example, following the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX, 2002), the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and 
National Association of Corporate Directors (NASD) proposed a new corporate 
governance listing-standard, which was approved by Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) on November 4, 2003. The new listing standards include 
provisions regarding board structure, audit committee composition and 
responsibilities, and other CG matters. 
Consistent with other countries, Malaysia encourages listed firms to follow 
the best practices of CG. Two important governance internal mechanisms discussed 
in the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) are board of directors and 
audit committee, consistent with their significant role in overseeing the financial 
reporting process (Yatim et al., 2006). One of the important elements of internal CG 
mechanisms is the board of directors (Fama and Jensen, 1983b). As capital structure 
decisions are influenced by managers who prefer to have debt rather than equity 
financing (Myers, 2001), the board of directors serves as an important mechanism for 
monitoring management decisions  (Shamsher and Zulkarnain, 2011).  
The board’s primary function is to protect the shareholders’ interests. 
According to Limpaphayom and Connelly (2006), the role of board of directors in 
overseeing management is needed to check on management and to make sure that the 
management has complied with all rules. Of special relevance to this research is that  
board of directors’ characteristics such as board size, board independence, board 
meetings, financial expertise board and others are argued to play a role in influencing 
cost of debts (Anderson et al., 2004; El Dahrawy et al., 2015; Ertugrul and Hegde, 




The audit committee is a sub-committee of the board of directors, which 
assumes some of the board’s responsibilities (Menon and Deahl Williams, 1994). 
The main functions of an audit committee are to assume the  responsibility of 
appointing the external auditor, meet regularly with the external and internal auditors 
to review the financial statements, audit process and internal controls of the firm (Al-
Mamun et al., 2014; Yassin and Nelson, 2012). This helps to lessen agency problems 
by the timely release of unbiased accounting information by managers to 
shareholders and others who rely on (Al-Mamun et al., 2014). Existence of audit 
committee is considered while making investment in company. Hence, with the wide 
adoption of the audit committee scholars suggests that the audit committee is an 
important element of the system of CG (Anderson et al., 2004; Karamanou and 
Vafeas, 2005; Mangena and Pike, 2005; Yassin and Nelson, 2012). As widely 
recognized, the duties of the audit committees have been related to internal audit see 
for example (Raghunandan et al., 2001; Yassin and Nelson, 2012), financial 
reporting (Song and Windram, 2004), and external auditor (Archambeault and 
DeZoort, 2001; Carcello and Neal, 2003). These three interrelated duties are 
discharged to audit committees to ensure that financial statements and external 
filings fairly represent the financial results of the company and to enable independent 
verification of the efficiency of systems and controls. 
External auditors are one of the important external CG mechanisms. External 
audits focus on aligning the interests of both managers and shareholders while 
reducing the possibility of information asymmetry in the capital markets. According 
to Cohen et al (2007), an auditor is responsible for the reliability of financial reports 
in situations where the audit committee is symbolic but may retain the power to 
question management. The effectiveness of an external auditor lies in their ability to 
produce pertinent and dependable financial information that can be used to create 
accurate financial reports (Raedy and Helms, 2002). DeFond et al. (2005) claim that 
the importance of role played by independent external auditors has been highlighted 
by the accounting scandals of the last twenty years and their association to the 




Companies with quality information and lower information asymmetry attract 
more investors, which encourages the market to further discount the company’s 
future earnings thus improving its current value and gains for current investors. The 
most common proxies for a company’s value are its market and accounting 
performance. However, a new concept is emerging that assesses an organization’s 
value based on its capacity to profit from lower cost of raising fund provided by the 
dynamic mechanisms of CG (Donker and Zahir, 2008).  
Several researchers have documented that poor internal monitoring (board of 
directors and audit committees) and external monitoring (the quality of the audits 
conducted by external auditors) lead to increased information asymmetry, agency 
problems, and a higher cost of debt capital (Bliss and Gul, 2012; El Dahrawy et al., 
2015; Kim et al., 2011; Koerniadi and Tourani-Rad, 2011; Pham et al., 2012; Soha, 
2011). On the other hand, reductions in information asymmetry and agency problems 
result in decreased cost of debt capital in the capital market. Sound CG monitors 
managerial practice in dealing with debt financing. In its absence the cost of debt 
goes up and firms with high cost of raising  fund decrease the rate of return to lenders 
and investors, which in turn unfavorably affect public confidence in the reliability of 
corporate reporting in capital market (El Dahrawy et al., 2015; Koerniadi and 
Tourani-Rad, 2011; Pham et al., 2012). 
These claims show the significant role played by internal and external 
monitoring in investment decisions made by investors and lenders in the capital 
market. This study claims that companies with strong internal monitoring 
mechanisms consisting of boards of directors, audit committees, and external 
monitoring in the form of high quality external auditors will lower the cost of raising 
fund from lenders (debt) in capital market. In contrast, firms with poor internal and 
external CG monitoring are likely to engage in more cost of raising fund from 
lenders that often disregarding the interests of both the owners and the debt holders. 
This requires the participation of key players in CG systems, especially local CG 
systems such as the Bursa Malaysia, Securities Commission (SC), corporate boards, 
corporate advisors, auditors, and management to prevent further accounting scandals 




Board of directors characteristics, audit committee characteristics and quality 
of the audits conducted by external auditors are CG tools. They act as control 
mechanism to lower of agency problem and information asymmetry in capital 
market. Research on cost of debt and CG has been dominated by studies on 
developed countries. There is an increasing awareness that theories validated by 
research on developed countries such as the USA and the UK may have limited 
applicability to emerging markets. Emerging markets have different characteristics 
such as different political, economic and institutional conditions, which may limit the 
application of theoretical models used to explain behavior in developed markets. 
Malaysia as an emerging market provides an excellent setting for the study of the 
impact of CG. It differs from developed countries in respect of various institutional 
characteristics such as stronger political connections (Gul, 2006), significant 
government, family ownership of firms (Lemmon and Lins, 2003) and concentrated 
ownership (Claessens et al., 2000).  In more general terms, Malaysia provides a 
setting for robust examination of the role of internal and external CG on lower of 
cost of debt in capital market. The next section discusses the problem statements 
presented in this thesis. 
1.3 Problem Statements  
 
Firms finance their activities using a combination of debt and equity capital. 
However, most successful companies depend on debt more than equity fund  
(Abdulhafedh, 2006; Ertugrul and Hegde, 2008). It has also been argued that a 
healthy financial structure must consist of a mix of debt and equity that may lead to a 
lower weighted average cost of capital (Keown et al., 2001). However, the 
importance of debt as a source of funding for companies should  be approached 
carefully, because excessive debt could affect companies’ results, which would 
eventually affect the shareholders wealth (Ertugrul and Hegde, 2008). 
CG mechanisms are a way to protect the shareholders and lenders interest. 




for the relationship between CG and cost of debt capital in this study is provided by 
the agency theory. The core of the agency theory is to resolve conflicts resulting 
from the separation of ownership and management control of corporate resources 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983b; Jensen, 1986). The existence of such conflicts of interest 
between owners and managers may affect the monitoring over company activity and 
information, which may consequently, increase the cost of raising fund in capital 
markets. Therefore, to control the conflict of interests and reduce agency costs, 
various internal and external tools, known as CG, have been suggested.  
A review of literature indicated that the quality and implementation of CG 
influences the cost of debt capital because high quality audits conducted by external 
auditors and the best practices of CG boost the confidence of managers, investors 
and lenders when making investment decisions. By contrast, as agency problems and 
information asymmetry increases, investors claim higher cost of debt capital because 
of the associated risks. On the other hand, the literature shows that poor quality 
external audit and weak CG leads to increased information asymmetry and agency 
problems, which ultimately leads to a higher cost of debt capital (Aldamen et al., 
2010; Ashbaugh-Skaife and LaFond, 2006; Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003; Bin-
Sariman et al., 2015; Cornaggia et al., 2015; Huguet and Gandía, 2014; 
Kholbadalov, 2012; Lou and Vasvari, 2009).  
Remarkably, most of the recently published research regarding CG and cost 
debt capital has focused primarily on U.S. and UK companies and other developed 
countries, with less attention being devoted to companies in emerging markets. 
Furthermore, most of the prior studies relating to internal CG and cost of debt capital  
have concentrated on ownership structures, voting rights, shareholder rights, and 
anti-takeover factors (Ashbaugh et al., 2004; Cheng et al., 2006; Farooq and Derrabi, 
2012; Klock et al., 2005; Regalli and Soana, 2012). Additionally, a review of the CG 
literature revealed that other important attributes can impact the perception of 
monitoring mechanisms held by shareholders and lenders because these attributes 
played a role in reducing information asymmetry and agency problems in the capital 
markets and consequently reduced cost of raising fund form lenders (debt) (Anderson 




2012; Upadhyay and Sriram, 2011). These attributes are classified as the 
effectiveness of the board of director and the effectiveness of audit committee. This 
includes internal monitoring by a boards of directors (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 
1983b) and audit committees (Pincus et al., 1990). However, little attention has been 
devoted to investigate the association between board of directors and audit 
committee characteristics (as a governance mechanism) and cost of debt capital 
particularly in emerging market such as Malaysia. 
The Malaysia Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) (2007 and 2012) for 
listed companies consider the role of board of directors to be an important 
mechanism for governance which protects investors from defaults and agency costs 
that company face when involve in financial transactions such as loans and others. 
Fama and Jensen (1983b) indicated that board of directors is one of the important 
mechanisms in internal CG mechanisms. Therefore, Klapper and Love (2004) argue 
that board of directors’ effectiveness lead to the protection of investors and lenders 
from the risks exposed as a result of borrowing from financial institutions, examples 
include defaults and increasing the cost of debt. Furthermore, Paige Fields et al. 
(2012) argue that board effectiveness may cause banks to have greater faith in 
internal governance mechanisms and thus reduce borrowing costs. More generally, 
the quality of the board may have a substantial impact on the cost of debt capital. 
Rajan (1992) argues that high quality boards, by better governance, may complement 
the monitoring role of banks and thus reduce the costs.  
The widespread use of audit committees and a quick glance at CG guidelines 
(MCCG, 2007 and 2012) highlights the importance placed on the role of 
appropriately constituted audit committee in monitoring the financial reporting 
process. Various regulatory committees reports (BRC, 1999; Committee, 1992) have 
recommended that a number of characteristics are important for an audit committee 
to perform its role competently and effectively. The combination of mechanisms can 
be considered better to reduce the agency problem and information asymmetry 
because a particular mechanism’s effectiveness depends on the effectiveness of 
others (Rediker and Seth, 1995). Audit committee characteristics, such as 




effectiveness (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Mangena and Pike, 2005). However, 
DeZoort et al. (2002) argue that the audit committee effectiveness framework could 
increase considerably if audit committee characteristics are studied together.  
This study suggests that an increase of the characteristics that enhance the 
board and audit committee effectiveness leads to a decrease of the level of 
information asymmetry and agency problem in capital market. Few studies have 
investigated the relationship between board of directors, audit committee 
characteristics and cost of debt by focusing on the impact of board independence, 
size, board ownership, audit committee size and independence (Adam et al., 2015; 
Anderson et al., 2004; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Ertugrul and Hegde, 2008; 
Paige Fields et al., 2012; Rahaman and Zaman, 2013; Tanaka, 2014).  
Most prior studies provided inconclusive or mixed results regarding the 
impact of CG and the cost of debt capital. Leaving the question of the impact of 
board and audit committee on cost of debt capital unanswered. Furthermore MCCG 
(2007 and 2012) consider the role of board of directors and audit committee to be a 
significant mechanism for governance which protects investors in capital market. 
Hence, this study aims to address this theoretical gap in the accounting literature and 
attempted to explore the relationship between board of directors characteristics 
namely size, independence, meeting, financial expertise and audit committee 
characteristics namely size, independence, meeting, financial expertise with the cost 
of debt by using sample of companies listed on the Malaysia capital markets. 
Prior studies on the cost of debt capital used governance indices to measure 
the effectiveness of the CG of company (Adam et al., 2015; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 
2006; Bin-Sariman et al., 2015; Chu et al., 2009; Paligorova and Yang, 2011; Zhu, 
2012). Bhagat et al. (2008) and Jiraporn and Chintrakarn (2009) claimed the 
governance indices have a serious weakness because some indices assign equal 
weights to all governance provisions included in the construction of the index. Some 
governance provisions may exacerbate managerial entrenchment, there is strong 
empirical evidence that staggered boards have more influence than any other 




address this gap in the accounting literature as it concentrates on the single CG 
characteristic, in order to capture the association between the board of directors and 
audit committees characteristic and cost of debt capital. 
The Malaysian capital market contains a unique corporate environment as its 
economy offers clearly identifiable capital segments divided along ethnic lines 
(Jesudason, 1989). After independence from the British in 1957, the government 
introduced the New Economic Policy (NEP) that gradually added Bumiputras to the 
Malaysian capital market (Jow et al., 2007). The presence of clearly recognizable 
ethnic domination of board membership and ownership of Malaysian listed 
companies provides evidence of monitoring differences that exist in these companies 
(Jow et al., 2007). Similarly, Chuah (1995) claimed that the minds of Malaysian 
managers are influenced by ethnicity, education, and the type of organizations they 
work for.  
In a study conducted by Archambault and Archambault (2003) companies in 
countries with a higher number of Muslim people had more transparent annual 
reports that reduced information asymmetry between companies and investors. 
According to Mohd Ghazali (2004) and Haniffa and Cooke (2002), there is a 
significant relationship between the number of directors in a board who are Malay 
and voluntary disclosure in annual reports. They found that Malaysian companies 
dominated by Malay directors have higher levels of voluntary disclosure, which is 
consistent with Islamic business ethics that encourage business transparency. Using 
the best practices of CG reduces information asymmetry and agency problems in 
capital market by encouraging high levels of transparency. A reduction of 
information asymmetry in capital market indirectly decreases the cost of raising fund 
from lenders. Prior studies have revealed that cultural characteristics such as 
ethnicity and education influences business processes, including disclosure, 
transparency, corporate social reporting, accounting conservatism, financial reporting 
quality, and earnings management, (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; Haniffa and Cooke, 
2002; Hashim, 2012; Rahman and Ali, 2006; Stulz and Williamson, 2003; Tosi and 
Greckhamer, 2004; Yunos et al., 2012). Currently, there is lack of empirical evidence 




the cost of debt capital. This is the first study that used ethnicity and education of 
corporate board for lowering agency problem in line of raising fund from lenders 
(debt). This study proposes that ethnicity and education of directors on the board 
enhance the transparency of company information, consequently leads to decrease of 
the level of information asymmetry and agency problem in capital market. Hence, 
this study addressed this theoretical gap by examining the effect of ethnicity and 
education of board and cost of debt capital as a bundle of board of director’s 
characteristic in protecting lenders’ interests in capital market.  
Audit quality of external auditors is another way to protect the lenders 
interest in capital market. The theoretical foundation of the relationship between 
audit quality and cost of debt capital in this study was provided by the signaling 
theory. Fundamental concern of signaling theory is the reduction information in 
capital market (Spence, 2002).  Signaling theory highlights the problems related to 
the information asymmetry in the markets. This theory presents how this information 
asymmetry can be lowered by the side with more information signaling to the other 
side (signaler and receiver). Hence, to decrease of information asymmetry in capital 
market, such external tools, known as audit quality of external auditors have been 
suggested. Recently, regulatory emphasis has been placed on the requirements for 
independent external auditors, the extent of the consultancy services, the non-audit 
services provided to audit customers, and use of the industry specialist auditors. The 
strong industry-specific knowledge offered by industry specialist auditor is expected 
to contribute to higher quality audits, more accurate financial information, and 
reduce information asymmetry in capital markets (Amir et al., 2010; Dhaliwal et al., 
2008; Li et al., 2010). Similarly, prior studies found that higher expensive audit fees 
were related to better monitoring (Elitzur and Falk, 1996; Hoitash et al., 2007).  
Most of the prior studies relating to audit quality and the cost of debt capital 
have concentrated on the size of the audit company, audit opinions, audit tenure, and 
Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors (Hwang et al., 2008; Karjalainen, 2011; Lai, 2011; Lou 
and Vasvari, 2009). Despite all the work done, substantial empirical evidence is still 
lacking and the many inconclusive and varying results leave the question of the 




industry specialist auditors) and the cost of debt capital still unanswered. Therefore, 
in terms of audit quality, the current literature only offers a partial concern of audit 
quality conducted by external auditors. Moreover, there is a lack in the studies of the 
potential effect of audit quality on the cost of debt capital. Hence, this study aims to 
address this theoretical gap in the accounting literature as it concentrated on the 
association between non-audit services, audit fees, and industry specialist auditors as 
proxies of audit quality and the cost of debt capital. 
1.4 Research Questions 
Based on the problem statements discussed above, the objective of this study 
was to answers to the research questions listed below: 
RQ1: Do board of directors characteristics (including: size, independence, 
financial expertise, meetings, ethnicity of directors and chairperson and education) 
affect the cost debt capital in Malaysian companies? 
RQ2: Do audit committees characteristics (including: size, independence, 
financial expertise and meetings) influence the cost debt capital in Malaysian 
companies? 
RQ3: Does audit quality proxies (including: audit fees, non-audit fees and 
industry specialist auditors) conducted by external auditors have significant effect on 
the cost of debt capital Malaysian companies? 
1.5 Research Objectives 
The objectives of this study were classified into three main objectives, which 




RO1: To assess whether board of directors characteristics (including: size, 
independence, financial expertise, meetings, ethnicity of directors and chairperson 
and education) have a significant effect on the cost of debt capital. 
RO2: To investigate the effect of audit committee characteristics (including: 
size, independence, financial expertise and meetings) on the cost of debt capital. 
RO3: To examine whether audit quality proxies (including: audit fees, non-
audit fees and industry specialist auditors) conducted by external auditors have a 
significant influence on cost of debt capital. 
1.6 Significance and Contributions of the Study 
This study suggested that the cost of raising funds from lenders (debt) in 
capital market depends on CG monitoring mechanisms. CG monitoring mechanisms 
are related to internal CG mechanisms including board of directors, audit 
committees, and the quality of the audits conducted by external auditors as external 
mechanism. This study contributed to the existing body of knowledge by filling in 
gaps in the financial and accounting literature by evaluating the association between 
internal CG characteristics and audit quality proxies on the cost of debt capital. The 
empirical findings revealed that large boards with independent non-executive 
directors that met infrequently, the ethnicity of the directors on the board, and larger 
audit committees that met frequently, significantly reduced agency problems related 
to internal monitoring functions. These effective monitoring reduce the cost of 
raising fund from lenders (debt) in the capital market. The results also indicates that 
hiring industry specialist auditors and using the non-audit services of external 
auditors significantly reduced information asymmetry connected to external 






This study contributes to knowledge in several ways: 
First, this study contributed to the existing body of knowledge by responding 
to the lack of finance and accounting literature by assessing the association between 
audit quality using external auditor proxies such as audit fees, non-audit services, and 
industry specialist auditors, and the cost of debt capital. No previous studies have 
examined the relationship between audit quality using these external auditor’s 
proxies and the cost of debt capital in Malaysia context. Currently, more regulatory 
emphasis has been placed on the requirement for independent external auditors, the 
extent of the consultancy services they offer, the non-audit services provided to audit 
customers, and the use of the industry specialist auditors. The strong industry 
specific knowledge of the industry audit specialists contributes to a better quality 
audits, more accurate financial information, and better monitoring, all of which 
reduce information asymmetry (Amir et al., 2010; de Fuentes and Sierra, 2015; 
Dhaliwal et al., 2008; Fernando et al., 2010; Hajiha and Sobhani, 2012; Hope et al., 
2009; Li et al., 2010). Better monitoring by auditors allows investors to forgo their 
own costly monitoring actions used to reduce the risk of expropriation by managers. 
The investigation of Malaysia companies expanded existing knowledge by providing 
evidence from external CG practices, different institutional settings, and litigation 
each of which encourage quality in the audit market. This study’s findings 
contributed to signaling theory by providing evidence that higher audit quality is 
associated with lower cost of debt capital. 
Second, this study was a pioneer study, as there are no studies that examined 
the effect of the cultural characteristics, specifically the ethnicity and education, of 
board members in a multicultural country such as Malaysia on the cost of debt 
capital. Previous studies have emphasized the effect of ethnicity and business 
processes, including disclosure, transparency, corporate social reporting, accounting 
conservatism, financial reporting quality and earnings management (Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2005; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Hashim, 2012; Rahman and Ali, 2006; Stulz 
and Williamson, 2003; Tosi and Greckhamer, 2004; Yunos et al., 2012). The results 
of this study contribute to cultural theory by revealing the increase of transparency 




results of this study can be used to decrease the cost of debt indirectly in the capital 
markets. The results of this study can also be used to improve information 
asymmetry in capital market, increase investment, and lower the cost of raising fund 
from lenders (debt) in capital market by increasing transparency and disclosure. 
Third, this study also contributed to the growing body of literature related to 
internal CG characteristics and cost of debt.  As stated earlier, prior research in these 
areas has focused on developed countries that have different legal and institutional 
environments and governance structures (Bradley and Chen, 2011; Gul et al., 2010; 
Hann et al., 2013; Huang and Wu, 2010; Paige Fields et al., 2012; Rahaman and 
Zaman, 2013; Upadhyay and Sriram, 2011). For example, some of these studies were 
conducted in the United States (Attig et al., 2012; Paligorova and Yang, 2011; Pham 
et al., 2012) and Australia. The results of these studies are limited and cannot be 
generalized to other countries. The results of this study contributed to agency theory 
by showing how increased internal monitoring by a board of directors and audit 
committees enhances shareholder confidence in the capital market by reducing 
agency problems. 
Fourth, many past studies related to CG and the cost of debt capital have 
concentrated on ownership structure, voting rights, shareholder rights, anti-takeover 
strategies, and institutional block holders (Farooq and Derrabi, 2012; Klock et al., 
2005; Pham et al., 2012; Piot and Missonier-Piera, 2007). Additionally, a review of 
the CG literature reveals that there are other important attributes that can affect the 
perception held by lenders of monitoring mechanisms and their role in reducing 
information asymmetry and agency problems in the capital markets. These attributes 
are representing in CG by the effectiveness of the board of directors and the audit 
committee. CG attributes that have an effect on reducing of the cost of raising  funds 
from lenders (debt) include internal monitoring by a board of directors (Fama, 1980; 
Fama and Jensen, 1983b), and audit committees (Pincus et al., 1990). 
Fifth, Malaysian CG codes have undergone a long process of amendments 
and enhancements to reach the current set of codes. The revisions made to the 




board of directors, audit committee, and internal audit processes. Nevertheless, the 
effect of CG characteristics such as the board of directors and audit committee 
characteristics on the cost of debt capital has not been tested empirically in Malaysia. 
This study is a pioneer study that assessed the effect of internal CG mechanisms such 
as characteristic of an effective board of directors (size, independent, meeting, 
financial expertise) and audit committee (size, independent, meeting, financial 
expertise) on the debt in emerging capital market such as Malaysia. The findings 
from this study contribute to agency theory by supporting the growth of internal 
monitoring mechanisms that improve confidence in the capital markets.  
Sixth, this study also contributed to the practice as the findings of this study 
have implications for managers of companies and individuals as well as institutional 
investors, regulators, and corporate directors. This study demonstrated to managers 
who are in charge of investor relations and other parties the advantages and costs of 
the best practices of CG.  
Seventh, this present study contributed to methodology literature by 
considering and using synthetic rating estimation methods as a proxy of cost debt 
capital as an alternative to playing the role of a ratings agency and assigning a rating 
to a company based on its financial ratios (synthetic ratings). To overcome the lack 
of rating information for Malaysia agencies, this study used the synthetic rating 
estimation method proposed by Damodaran (2002) as a proxy of cost debt capital. 






Table ‎1.1:  Summary of this Research 
Research Gap RQ 1 Findings Conclusion Contribution Implication 
-A lack of studies 
related to the 
relationship between 
board of director’s 
characteristics and the 
cost of debt capital due 
to the mixed and 
inconclusive results of 
previous studies.  
 
-No previous studies 
examined the effect of 
board of director’s 
characteristics on the 
cost of debt capital in 
Malaysian. 
 
-No previous studies 
examined the impact 
ethnicity and 
education of the 
directors on the board 
on cost of debt capital.  







of directors and 
chairperson and 
education) affect 




-Board size, independent 
non-executive directors, 
and the ethnicity of Malay 
directors have a 
significant negative effect 
on the cost of debt capital.  
 
-Board meetings had a 
positive and significant 





The results indicate 
that characteristics of 
the board of directors 
have a significant 
ability to decrease 
agency problems, 
which helps lower the 
cost of raising fund 
from lenders in the 
capital market. 
Theoretical 
-This study contributed to agency 
theory by concentrating on 
monitoring the role of the best 
practices of internal CG (such as 
board of director’s effectiveness) 
within companies to reduce the 
components of cost for raising fund 
in capital market. 
-This study contributed to cultural 
theory by concentrating on linking 
the ethnicity of the Malay directors 
who sit on the board of directors with 
line a decrease in the cost of raising 




The findings of this study have 
implications for managers of 
companies, individuals, institutional 
investors, regulators, and corporate 
directors. 
Methodological 
A methodological approach for 
measuring the cost of debt based on 
the synthetic rating estimation 






-Implications for corporations 
that need to satisfy lenders 
and attract potential investors 
include the ability of measure 
the impact of monitoring 
systems such as CG so that 
decision makers can evaluate 
the role of these monitoring 
systems in enhancing lenders 
perception of the quality of 
financial information.  
 
-This study added to the 
understanding of agency 
theory in a developing 
country where companies are 
monitored by internal CG 
mechanisms (board of 
directors effectiveness), in 
which the agency 







Research Gap RQ 2 Findings Conclusion Contribution Implication 
.-A lack of studies 
related to the 
relationship between 
audit committee 
characteristics and the 
cost of debt capital due 
to the inconclusive 
results of previous 
studies.  
 
-No previous studies 
examined the effect of 
audit committee 
characteristics on the 










influence the cost 




-The size of the audit 
committee had a 
significant negative effect 
on the cost of debt capital. 
 
-Audit committee 
meetings had a significant 
negative effect on the cost 
of debt capital. 
 
The results indicate that 
characteristics of the 
audit committee have a 
remarkable ability to 
reduce information 
asymmetry and agency 
problems, which helps 
lower the cost of raising 




-This study contributed to agency theory 
by concentrating on monitoring the role of 
the best practices of internal CG (such as 
audit committee effectiveness) within 




The findings of this study have 
implications for internal auditor and audit 




A methodological approach for measuring 
the cost of debt based on the synthetic 

















from the findings of 
this study because they 
will have a better 
understanding of how 
internal CG 
characteristics such as 
(audit committee 
effectiveness) affect the 
cost of debt capital. 
 
-The CG authorities, 
especially in Malaysia, 
can use this study as 
empirical support for 
developing their 









Research Gap RQ 3 Findings Conclusion Contribution Implication 
-There is a need 
to investigate the 
effect of audit 
quality proxies 
(audit fees, non-
audit fees and 
industry specialist 
auditors) on the 
cost of debt 
capital due to a 
lack of studies 
and the mixed 
results of the 
previous studies 
that do exist.  
 
















effect on the cost 




fees have a 
significant and 
negative effect on the 
cost of debt capital. 
 
-Using auditors who 
specialize in an 
industry has a 
significant and 
negative effect on the 
cost of debt capital. 
 
The results show 






specialize in an 






lowers the cost of 
raising funds from 
lenders in the 
capital market. 
Theoretical 
-This study contributed to signaling theory by 
focusing on the external monitoring role of 
audit quality as a way to reduce the cost of 
raising funds from lenders in the capital 
market. 
-The prevalent doubts expressed in the 
literature regarding how proxies for audit 




The findings from this study have 
implications for managers of companies, 
internal and external auditors, and regulators.  
 
Methodological 
-A methodological approach for measuring the 
cost of debt capital based on the synthetic 
rating estimation method was developed in 
this study. 
 
-This study has added to 
the understanding of 
signaling theory in 
developing countries, 
where companies are 
monitored by external CG 
mechanisms such as the 
quality of the audits 
conducted by external 
auditors with complex 
information asymmetry in 
the capital market. 
-Stock market authorities 
can employ this study’s 
results to evaluate the role 
of the quality of an audit 
conducted by an external 
auditor to improve the 
quality of information and 
accounting reports in 





1.7 Scope of the Study 
In line with the research objectives, this study was carried out using 
companies listed on the Bursa Malaysia from various industries (construction, 
industrial products, plantations, properties, consumer products, hotels, REITS, 
infrastructure, tin, mining, technology, trade, and services) from 2003 to 2012. This 
study empirically assess the relationship between the internal CG mechanisms 
characteristics of an effective board of directors and audit committee, the quality of 
audits conducted by external auditors as external CG mechanisms proxies (non-audit 
services, audit fees and industry specialized auditor) on the cost of debt capital. 
Related objectives were examined using the three main research questions. Each of 
the research questions were deconstructed into testable hypotheses. The Table 1.2 













Table ‎1.2:  Summary of Hypotheses and the Underlying Theories 
Objectives Hypothesis Theory 
1 
H1: Larger boards of directors are associated with lower 




H2: Larger proportion of independent boards of 




H3: Financial expertise director on the board is 




H4: There is a relationship between the board’s meeting 




H5: There is a relationship between ethnicity of director 
on the board and cost of debt capital.  
Cultural 
Theory 
H6: There is a relationship between ethnicity of 
chairperson on the board and cost of debt capital.  
Cultural 
Theory 
H7: There is a relationship between qualification of 





H8: Larger audit committees are associated with lower 




H9: Larger proportion of independent audit committees 




H10: There is a negative relationship between the audit 




H11: There is a relationship between the audit 





H12: There is a positive relationship between audit fees 
and cost of debt capital.  
Signaling 
Theory 
H13: There is a negative relationship between Non- audit 
service fees and cost of debt capital.  
Signaling 
Theory 
H14: There is a negative relationship between industry 








1.8 Methodology  
In addressing the concerns enumerated in the study objectives the researcher 
adopts a positivist epistemological construct and uses a deductive research approach 
and quantitative research strategy relying on secondary data. Specifically, the annual 
reports of companies, both in hard copy and on-line versions, as well as, information 
from DataStream, a Blomberg database were used extensively. The data collected 
were prepared (which involved classification, rearrangement, and transformation) to 
make them ready for statistical and econometric processing. The statistical software 
STATA version 13 is utilized for data analysis. The data analysis involves techniques 
such as the descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, multivariate regression 
(ordinary least square (OLS) regression model), assumption for multiple regressions 
analyses and robustness analysis. 
1.9 Limitation of the Study  
The main objective of the thesis was to contribute to the debate on the 
relationship between; internal and external CG characteristics, especially the board of 
director and audit committee characteristics, audit quality of external auditors and 
their effect on cost of debt capital. Some of the study limitations are discussed below: 
The sample companies cover most industries but financial institutions were 
not included in the sampling framework of this study because of their different 
capital structure, regulations, profits (Ali Shah and Butt, 2009; Pham et al., 2012; 
Ramly, 2012) and materially different types of operations (Mohd Ghazali and 
Weetman, 2006). The exclusion of financial institutions limited the generalizability 
of the results across all industrial sectors. This limitation should be researched in 
future studies as the sample companies used in this study do not reflective of all 
companies, especially companies in the financial sector. 
Some external audit quality variables such as non-audit fees, audit fees and 




indicate auditor independence and audit quality. In this thesis, the audit quality 
measures were driven by the auditor’s reputation and perceived auditor 
independence. Thus, the results were based on market perceptions (audit quality as 
perceived by market participants).The use of other audit quality measures such as 
restatements and auditor litigation may help to generalize the actual audit quality 
rather than the perceived audit quality. 
This study estimated the cost of debt capital using two methods: the synthetic 
rating estimation and average interest rate method. Although there are other methods 
for estimating the cost of debt capital, such as the yield spread and yield to maturity 
method recommended by (Anderson et al., 2004; Duffee, 1998; Ertugrul and Hegde, 
2008; Klock et al., 2005). This study did not use either of those two due to their lack 
of information regarding the capital market for companies listed on the Bursa 
Malaysia. The limitations of study should be researched in future studies as 
additional methods for estimating the cost of debt capital may help generalize better 
results.  
1.10 Thesis Outline  
This study is organized into five chapters. The first chapter presents the 
research background and problem statements. In addition to, the research questions, 
research objectives, significance and contributions made by the study along with a 
short description of the scope of the study, methodology, limitation of study and 
terminology used are also covered.  
Chapter two provides a general understanding of the nature of CG in general, 
and overview of Malaysian CG, and the development of the CG code. It discusses 
the demand for auditing services and quality audits, the monitoring role of the board 
of directors, audit committees, and external auditors. It also provides a general 
understanding of the cost of debt capital. It highlights theoretical frameworks, such 
as agency theory, signaling theory, and cultural theory. It provides a review of past 




capital. The chapter ends with the research framework and the development of the 
hypotheses based on previous studies.  
Chapter three provides the methodological framework utilized in this study. It 
elaborates and justifies the selection process used to generate samples, the duration 
of the study, sources of data, and data collection methods. The methods used to 
measure the independent and dependent variables, control variables, and model 
specifications are provided. The analysis process, a summary of methods used for 
testing the hypotheses, and measurement of variables are revealed. 
Chapter four reports the results of the empirical findings related to CG, audit 
quality, and the cost of debt capital based on the objectives of study. It begins with 
descriptive statistics and correlation analysis, which is then followed by presenting 
the results of the tested models and the inferences occurring from the hypothesis 
testing. The outcome of the empirical findings regarding the relationships between 
CG characteristics and audit quality proxies on the cost of debt capital is presented. 
The results of additional analyses are also given to confirm the robustness of the 
initial regression analyses. 
Chapter five includes a summary and discussion of the findings of the study 
and how it relates to prior research findings and related theories. This is followed by 
a description of the limitations of the study and possible avenues for further research 
before a final conclusion is presented.  
1.11 Terminology  
Particular terms were used in this study and they are defined as follows: 
 Corporate Governance (CG): The Cadbury Committee Report (1992) point 
out that CG is an arrangement through which organizations are controlled and 
directed. It identifies the functions of key people in a company who are 




 Board of directors: Fama and Jensen (1983b) defined the board of directors as 
those who ratify management decisions, monitor performance, manage 
decisions and decision control functions. The board of directors is statutorily 
appointed by the shareholders to represent and protect their interests and they 
represent the highest decision making body of a company. 
 Audit committee: The audit committee is defined as a subcommittee of board 
of directors that is comprised mostly of non- executive or independent 
directors who are responsible for overseeing auditing activities (Abernathy et 
al., 2011; Birkett, 1986; Collier, 1993). 
 Audit Quality: The quality of audit services is defined as the market-assessed 
joint probability that a given auditor will both (a) discover a breach in the 
client’s accounting system and (b) report that breach (DeAngelo, 1981b). 
 Information asymmetry: Information asymmetry is the information gap 
between mangers and investors. When information asymmetry between 
managers and investors increases, investors increase the cost of raising fund 
because of the associated risk  (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991).  
 Cost of Debt: The minimum expected return that providers of debt financial   
require before they will lend to companies. The cost of obtaining and using 
interest-paying liabilities is known as the cost of debt. Generally, companies 
incur debt through the issuance of debentures and bonds. Thus, the cost of 
debt is the cost associated with interest payments and other costs connected to 
issuing debentures and bonds  (Pratt and Grabowski, 2008).  
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fees and engaging industry specialist auditor incurred lower cost of debt capital. This 
suggested that that a higher quality audits reduced information asymmetries in 
capital markets and consequently lower debt financing. The results of using industry 
specialist auditors and the cost of debt capital demonstrated that there was a 
significant negative relationship between engaging industry specialist auditors and 
the cost of debt capital. Based on signaling theory, the research result provided 
empirical evidence that lenders and investors can use to evaluate the benefits of 
auditor specialization for reducing information asymmetry in capital markets and 
consequently increase the quality of an audit.  
The findings of the study revealed that companies audited by auditor who 
specialize in an industry provide higher audit quality. This suggests that debt 
investors charge lower rates for debt capital because of the perceived lower risks for 
these companies. There was a significant relationship between the use of auditors 
who specialize in an industry and the cost of debt in Malaysia context. The results 
regarding the effect of non-audit services on the cost of debt capital suggested that 
there is a significant and negative relationship between the costs of debt capital when 
higher non-audit service fees were incurred. The results were robust under various 
tests of robustness and sensitivity. There was no evidence to suggest that there was a 
relationship between audit fees and the cost of debt capital in Malaysia.  
Overall, the present study concludes that agency problems can be reduced by 
encouraging internal CG characteristics that are associated with effective boards of 
directors and audit committees that supports their internal monitoring functions. This 
study also concludes that lowering the cost of capital may increase the demand for 
higher audit quality, because higher audit quality is expected to reduce information 
asymmetry and consequently lowering the cost of debt capital.   
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